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1Chapter
Delimitation of Unbeatable Fear in 
Facing the State of Necessity
Rodrigo Andrés Guerra Espinosa
Abstract
This chapter focuses on the study of the limits of unbeatable fear in the state of 
necessity. Unbeatable fear remains one of the most complex exemptions to inter-
pret, and it stands as a relevant issue both around sacrifice of persons and in cases 
of violence against women in Chile. Hence, our objective is not a mere analysis of 
unbeatable fear but rather its delimitation with respect to the state of necessity. The 
problem has its origin in specifying whether some of the requirements of unbeat-
able fear are part of the state of necessity. Therefore, the treatment of the nature of 
this kind of fear, as we have stated, is not peaceful in doctrine and creates insecurity 
in its interpretation. Therefore, the study of unbeatable fear deserves attention since 
it entails the analysis of fundamental concepts of the criminal law theory.
Keywords: fear, necessity defense, posttraumatic stress disorder, 
learned helplessness, lesser evil principle
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the study of the limits of unbeatable insurmountable 
fear in the state of necessity [1]. This problem is observed in the case of Karina 
Sepúlveda, RUC N° 1101060685-5, of June 21, 2013, before the Sixth Oral Criminal 
Court of Puente Alto. The Puente Alto Court determined that Karina’s behavior 
conformed to a decision of the state of necessity of art. 10, N°11. Although, in 
the first ruling, the court accepted that a possible mental disturbance of Karina 
(learned helplessness) [2] explains the content of the subsidiarity clause of the 
state of necessity; the court dismissed it in its second ruling. Karina deliberately 
made the decision to kill her abuser in order to face the imminent danger she was 
in, without suffering a disturbance of learned helplessness due to insurmountable 
fear, according to the judgment of the Sixth Oral Criminal Court of Puente Alto, 
RUC No. 1101060685-5, June 21, 2013. Hence, our objective is not a mere analysis of 
unbeatable fear, but rather its delimitation with respect to the state of necessity.
The treatment of unbeatable fear is necessary, especially if we consider that, 
except for some specialized comments on the subject [3], our doctrine has not 
performed an analysis of fear with the same intensity as other criminal exemp-
tions. For the same reason, the state of necessity will be treated from the following 
conceptualization: “the state of necessity is a conflict of interest of adjustable 
inevitability where the absence of moderation implies its full preponderance. 
Therefore, the distinction of the effects depends on a weighting of interests that has 
the essential core of human dignity as a limitation” [4]. This, to delimit the fear of 
this last exemption.
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The question thus arises as to what the nature fear is and what its requirements 
are. A question that does not allow a single answer because it will depend on the 
meaning of such a fear. If we focus our attention on dogmatics, we can observe 
that there are some positions that only include a justifying effect in art. 10, N° 11, 
displacing the exculpatory effect from the state of necessity to the insurmountable 
fear. Well, they hold that art. 10, N° 11 includes two forms of state of necessity: the 
defensive and aggressive state of necessity [5]. This position bases its arguments in 
that the fourth circumstance of art. 10, N° 11 only indicates that unenforceability 
excludes the possibility of requiring other conduct, is predominantly personal, and 
that neither the subsidiarity nor the weighting of evils have space in the exculpatory 
state of necessity [6]. Hence, the insurmountable fear is a space that would admit 
these hypotheses of inexplicability. Others point out that the functional equivalent 
closest to the exculpatory state of necessity of art. 10, N° 11 is found in the insur-
mountable fear of art. 10, N° 9 [3], because it is part of the vis compulsiva, that is, 
unrelated to a ground for innocence.
Accordingly, it is considered that, regardless of the field of intersection between 
insurmountable fear and the state of necessity, the overlap is not complete [5]. 
Thus, it could be explained why irresistible mental force or unbeatable fear, 
even if we are not in the presence of an objectively present or imminent danger, 
could exempt liability outside the limits of the state of necessity [5]. The problem 
described also has its origin in specifying whether some of the requirements of 
unbeatable fear are part of the state of necessity. Hence, the treatment of the nature 
of it, as we have stated, is not peaceful in doctrine and creates insecurity in its inter-
pretation. Therefore, the study of it deserves attention since it entails the analysis of 
fundamental concepts of the general part and sentences that allow to redefine the 
limits of this exemption in attention to the extensive field of application of art. 10, 
N° 11, which specifies the demands of subsidiarity and proportionality [7].
In this line, the position presented by Juan Domingo Acosta in the processing of 
Law 20.480 is inserted as proof of the importance of differentiating fear from the 
state of necessity. Acosta exposed a series of arguments that common sense judges 
as characteristic of the insurmountable fear, to later show the differences with the 
state of necessity. The first is that work began on some modifications regarding 
art. 10, N° 9 of the Criminal Code in the Bill contained in bulletin N° 5308-18, of 
September 5, 2007, which sought to replace the phrase “or driven by an insurmount-
able fear” with the phrase “under the threat of suffering a serious and imminent 
evil,” and move the “insurmountable fear” to No. 10 of art. 10. This proposal was 
intended to incorporate, in No. 9, the requirement that whoever acts, violated by an 
irresistible force, does so under the threat of suffering a serious and imminent evil.
It was thus decided to incorporate this third requirement (under the threat 
of suffering a serious and imminent evil) in art. 10, N° 9, to establish what the 
doctrine understood as the exculpatory state of necessity, as stated in the Report 
of August 6, 2008, of the Constitution, Legislation and Justice Committee of the 
Chamber. Despite the incorporation of the third requirement in art. 10, N° 9, the 
Constitution, Legislation, Justice Committee and Regulations of the Senate decided 
to eliminate it because it constituted a repetition of what was already contemplated 
in N° 9 of art. 10, as indicated in its second Report of October 13, 2009. In this 
second report, Acosta emphasized that, although it is convenient to include a rule 
of exculpation for a state of necessity, the wording of art. 10, N° 9 did not seem 
appropriate. And the reason for this is that, after the current wording of art. 10, 
N° 9, the intention was “to conceive an external factor that acts on the will of the 
subject, such as force or fear, to the point of influencing the subject in an irresistible 
or insurmountable way to perform a certain conduct, i.e., to the point that another 
way of proceeding is not required of the subject.”
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This interpretation of Acosta undoubtedly implies points of divergence in the 
Chilean doctrine that, around the nature of fear, can be systematized in three 
theses. The first thesis establishes that insurmountable fear is an exculpatory state 
of necessity because it encompasses hypotheses of unenforceability that cannot be 
contemplated in a state of necessity containing a subsidiarity clause [8]. The second 
is that insurmountable fear represents a simile of irresistible force. Irresistible force, 
in which both the vis absoluta and compulsiva converge in attention to the formula-
tion of the French, Dutch, and Belgian models [9]. Finally, the third maintains that 
insurmountable fear explains situations of excess in the state of necessity due to the 
presence of an emotional disturbance. Therefore, how do we know if insurmount-
able fear is autonomous or functionally equivalent to the state of necessity? It is 
therefore an issue still under discussion that makes it necessary to redefine the 
contours of fear. Therefore, our main objective is to determine if insurmountable 
fear is an autonomous figure and then analyze its limits and scope against the state 
of necessity. Our conjecture is that insurmountable fear presents particularities that 
do not respond to the state of necessity and only denote the existence of a danger-
ous situation in common [10]. Therefore, in the next section, we will discuss some 
considerations about insurmountable fear that are necessary for the understanding 
of its meaning.
We will divide the exhibition into two parts. The first part will focus on the theo-
retical foundations and the state of the art on which our proposal is based, in order 
to warn of the problem of differentiation of insurmountable fear before the state of 
necessity, and the second part will focus on the bibliographic discussion around the 
problem. Finally, this second part proposes how to solve the problem and what is 
achieved by finding an answer.
2. Insurmountable fear in Chilean and comparative doctrine
When we talk about insurmountable fear, there is consensus in Chilean doctrine 
to consider it a ground for exculpation [11]. In general terms, it is understood as 
the emotional disturbance that is a consequence or effect of a serious present or 
imminent evil which, without excluding the agent’s volition, exempts liability. The 
concept of volition (willentlich) implies for us an act of minimum basic freedom, 
consisting of acting with a minimum alternative (to act or stop acting, to leave 
inactivity or remain in it). Hence, it is declared that not all coercion is part of the 
insurmountable fear, and it is even indicated that certain professionals must tolerate 
insurmountable fears in risky activities [12]. Thus, it is frequently related to the 
intimidation or threat that certain situations generate. Situations of fear in which 
insuperability points to external or internal factors affect the agent’s conduct. Well, 
either by affirming that fear is a disturbance that explains excesses in self-defense, 
or by rightly affirming that it is an analogous form of necessity, a good part of the 
Chilean doctrine held that, before the state of necessity of art. 10, N° 11, an excul-
patory state of necessity was not necessary because the disposition of insurmount-
able fear was more than enough for these purposes. Likewise, even in the first years 
of the Code, some authors interpreted insurmountable fear from the logic of the 
state of necessity, referring to the vagueness and indeterminacy of the term fear in 
order to accept the state of necessity cases impossible to contemplate in art. 10, N° 7.
But one must not lose sight of the fact that incorporating the exculpatory state 
of necessity through insurmountable fear makes it difficult to define the nature of 
both exemptions. Therefore, before art. 10, N° 11, the advisability of incorporating 
or modifying some of the existing provisions in the Code is discussed to give rise to 
a broad state of necessity, which would admit new hypotheses of unenforceability. 
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Thus, it is essential to study the scope and effects of insurmountable fear, because 
it is unreasonable that it fulfills the same function of the state of necessity. And the 
argument is that a functional equivalence of both exemptions produces an affecta-
tion of the contradiction principle. Well, although there are common elements 
between insurmountable fear and the state of necessity, the function of fear is, 
from the dogmatic point of view, independent of the state of necessity. This is why 
the delimitation of these exemptions, especially in view of the disadvantages of 
substantiating the state of necessity in an emotional disturbance that explains the 
selection of the least harmful means [13].
This is a complex but necessary problem that, in the legal Spanish model, trans-
lates into three dogmatic positions. The first argues that fear is a mental disturbance 
that affects a situation of danger. In this context, if the fear that a person suffers 
is “of pathological origin caused by the schizophrenia he or she suffers […] fear, 
as such, cannot be taken into account. Therefore, if the fear exemption cannot be 
applied, it will be necessary to resort to transient mental disorder” [14]. The second 
indicates that insurmountable fear is an exculpatory state of necessity. Those who 
adopt it, as we have seen in the Chilean model, argue that the exculpatory state 
of necessity, not covered in the justifying state of necessity of art. 20, N° 5 of the 
Spanish Criminal Code, is in the insurmountable fear of art. 20, N° 6 [15]. Faced 
with this issue, a third tendency has led to observe, in the insurmountable fear, a 
mixed nature in some of the Spanish Supreme Court judgments, which, in some 
cases, confers particular characteristics of a ground for unenforceability and, in 
other characteristics, a ground for indictment [16].
In this way, an interpretative line of insurmountable fear about the presence or 
absence of a disturbance and its particularities in situations of necessity is outlined 
in the Spanish model. In the German legal model, on the other hand, express 
mention is made of fear in cases of excessive self-defense (§ 33 German Criminal 
Code). If the agent exceeds the limits of self-defense because of confusion, dread, 
or fear, he or she will not be punished. This excess in the legitimate self-defense 
of fear is classified, according to the dominant doctrine—despite its regulation 
between the grounds for justification of § 32 (legitimate self-defense) and that 
of § 34 (state of necessity) German Criminal Code—as a ground for exculpation. 
Fear that requires exceeding the limits of self-defense through an asthenic outburst. 
Hence, non-asthenic outbursts, typical of anger, rage, indignation, or revenge, are 
not part of this defense. According to the dominant doctrine, fear also comes into 
consideration when the limits of self-defense are consciously violated [17]. However, 
the applicability of § 33 is denied when the author has been involved in a violent 
dispute. However, contrary to this interpretation, it is noted that only § 35 (exculpa-
tory state of necessity) has excluded exculpation in case the agent causes the danger 
(§ 35.1 2), while that limitation would not exist in § 33 [18].
In summary, insurmountable fear seems to require the presence of an asthenic 
outburst that explains the excess in cases of self-defense. In this sense, in the state of 
necessity, it seems to us that the idea “that it is typical of man to have an irresistible 
tendency to save himself, literally, at any price, in the face of the danger of his own 
extinction” [19]. However, this does not imply rejecting the idea that, in some cases, 
there may be a mental disturbance that explains the excess in cases of necessity 
[20]. From this, one might think that fear would have a psychological substrate that 
would be incompatible with the requirements of the state of necessity. In this sense, 
some authors indicate that a purely psychological position of the unenforceability 
that only contemplates the basis of impunity in the author’s exceptional psycho-
logical situation is not held, in a way that makes it impossible to behave according 
to the rule [20]. The very objectifying wording of precepts such as § 35 German 
Criminal Code speaks against it. Therefore, several authors observe difficulties in its 
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application in cases of necessity. And, for the same reason, its notion of culpability 
transforms, acting differently in the sole criterion of imposing a criminal sanction. 
In contrast, another area of the doctrine maintains that it is possible to apply § 33 
by analogy in the justifying state of necessity (§ 34 German Criminal Code), in the 
defensive state of necessity (§ 228 of the German Civil Code), or in the case of pro-
visional detention of § 127 (German Code of Criminal Procedure) [21]. However, 
this requires, in fear, a factual situation similar to that set forth in § 34, § 228, and 
§ 127, and an indetermination—not planned—in the regulation [22].
Although, we cannot ignore that § 33 has a hypothesis that restricts fear solely 
to situations of excessive self-defense [23], the Chilean legal system does not follow 
this trend. Well, insurmountable fear is a figure that art. 10, N° 9 does not restrict to 
excesses in legitimate self-defense. However, this problem of analogical application 
of fear in the state of necessity is rather dogmatic in the German model because it 
has not had any repercussions (unlike the Chilean system) on jurisprudence [24].
3. Discussion around the differentiation of fear and the state of necessity
In conformity with the general description of the doctrinal, legal, and juris-
prudential treatment of insurmountable fear and the state of necessity already 
carried out in the first section of this chapter, now we must define the legal nature 
of insurmountable fear and delimit it from the state of necessity, considering the 
introduction of art. 10, N° 11 in the Criminal Code.
It is easier to clear up some questions about the nature of insurmountable 
fear in the doctrine of the irresistible impulse. This doctrine delimits the degree 
of intensity that insurmountable fear requires [25, 26]. Today, we cannot doubt 
that insurmountable fear is marked by the consequences of this doctrine in juris-
prudence. According to this tendency, the Court of Appeals of Santiago, against 
Ana Medina Soto, of September 30, 1969, established that “fear is a distressing 
disturbance of the mind caused by a threatening danger or evil, real or imaginary; 
and it is insurmountable when it superimposes itself on the will in such a way that 
drives it to the realization of actions that, without it, would not have been executed, 
dominating the will without constituting a ground for non-imputability, but one 
of non-enforceability of other conduct and which, generically, is classified among 
those of culpability.”
Therefore, many of the problems of this doctrine of impulse pertain to insu-
perability. That is, around how to determine the degree of disturbance that fear 
requires. In this field, the “irresistible impulse” makes it possible to define the 
level of disturbance through a graduation that is collected from the psychology of 
impulses [27]. The agent can only be governed by regulations in the event that his 
or her ability to control remains unchanged in the situation he or she faces. From 
which, methodological consequences derive around the psychology of impulses. 
On the one hand, that the irresistible impulse be treated from a philosophical 
model that denies the formulation of the irresistible impulse due to its metaphysical 
assumptions. This presupposes accepting a classical form of psychoanalysis that is 
incompatible with phenomenology.
In this line, it is indisputable that criminal law is not psychiatry or philosophy, 
so the adoption of phenomenology as a tool for graduating the irresistible impulse 
requires foundation. However, in the history of criminal dogmatics, phenomenol-
ogy initially appears with the theory of finalist action by Hans Welzel and does 
so in the hands of phenomenological psychologists [28]. However, there is no 
pronouncement in the Chilean dogmatic that is decisive in the matter. The specific 
problems posed by insurmountable fear have been attempted in dogmatics since 
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the well-known case of Karina Sepúlveda. But as we have already explained in the 
first part of this chapter, it seems inadmissible that the subsidiarity clause of the 
state of necessity is at the mercy of an asthenic outburst. If, as conjectured here, it is 
understood that insurmountable fear is an autonomous exemption from the state of 
necessity, the irresistible impulse may have a role in it.
This seemed to be the case of the Judgment of the Court of Appeals of San 
Miguel, Case N° 1966-94, of December 20, 1994. In this case, Raúl Enfraín Ortiz is 
prosecuted for killing a subject and leaving another seriously injured by hammering 
his head. A situation occurring while these dangerous subjects slept. The motiva-
tion of the agent’s action focused on protecting his 11-year-old son from these two 
armed subjects (seasoned criminals) who, escaping from the police, threatened to 
kill his son if he tried to report them to the police or flee from the place where they 
were. The judgment of the Court correctly indicated that, although the medical-
legal report “concludes that … the accused would have presented a state of intense 
emotional alteration … of explosive and primitive features,” and a decrease in the 
imputability would correspond “to the defendant, in the terms of art. 11, N° 1; in 
relation to article 10, N° 1 of the Criminal Code, the latter is not binding on the 
judge, the only one in charge of making legal assessments regarding the verifica-
tions of the auxiliary sciences of Criminal Law.”
The court came to the conviction that “given the serious situation of previous 
intimidation that affected the defendant—and that included his eleven-year-old 
son—by two armed subjects who were fleeing from police harassment, one of which 
(El Toro de Quilamuta) was known to be a highly dangerous criminal, his violent 
reaction against them was determined by a very strong emotional impetus that 
dominated his will [for] the psychological environment of anguish he was in.” The 
situation of real danger of intimidation above produces a disturbance in the agent 
that enhances his or her action on dangerous subjects. The court decided to exempt 
the defendant from liability, considering his sociocultural and psychological back-
ground. Likewise, it considered that the agent’s behavior was within the parameters 
of unenforceability of art. 10, N° 9. The problem of insurmountable fear —raised 
by the enunciated situations of danger (cases of Karina Sepúlveda and Raúl Enfraín 
Ortiz) —becomes a question of whether there are other factors of unenforceability, 
such as, for example, serious mental disturbances, but of less intensity to those of a 
ground for innocence, which give rise to the action of the necessity and explain the 
lack of subsidiarity and proportionality in the state of necessity.
What is unquestionable is that, in those cases, there is culpability in the tra-
ditional sense and that, if the agent suffers from a serious disorder (foreign to a 
transient mental disorder), he or she must respond. However, if our hypothesis of 
insurmountable fear is accepted, it would seem to be correct to extend it to cases 
of excess in the state of necessity. It can be argued that insurmountable fear could 
extend the limits of exclusion of liability in cases of necessity. However, such a con-
jecture is preferable, for its dogmatic clarity, to a theory that confers insurmount-
able fear on the role of a ground for exculpation of diffuse and general content.
Another problem in insurmountable fear, whose consideration deserves treat-
ment, is that of the reality and unreality of situations of danger. Attempts have 
already been made to demonstrate that it is a problem present in Chilean and 
Spanish dogmatics [9]; however, in the context that interests us now, its applica-
tion would have repercussions in the treatment of situations of unreal danger in 
insurmountable fear. This possibility has been proposed in the Spanish dogmatics 
by Cuerda Arnau, who also seeks to exclude culpability and that, in the opposite 
sense to the conjecture set forth herein, is based on these effects in the following 
argument: if fear can only understand real evils, then we face two problems. The 
first one is that accepting only real evils in insurmountable fear would excessively 
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restrict the application of exemption. The second is that insurmountable fear could 
not be distinguished from the state of necessity [29]. To escape this idea that insur-
mountable fear is a space where unreal evils coexist, it would be necessary to prove 
that the function of the irresistible impulse has rigorous application [30].
In this context, it can be seen in the Anglo-Saxon model that the irresistible 
impulse is historically known and is integrated into doctrine and jurisprudence. The 
irresistible impulse is an expression that has its origin in the psychology of impulses 
and aims to determine if the agent presented an emotional state at the time of the 
execution of the act. Within the criminal field, the following authors have spoken 
about this requirement, but in a different way: Michael S. Moore and Joel Feinberg. 
Thus, the differentiating effect of the irresistible impulse is reserved to estimate the 
degree of disturbance that the agent suffers at the moment of executing the act and 
whether this degree of disturbance is a characteristic of insurmountable fear.
Michael S. Moore’s approach is a clear rejection of the irresistible impulse, as the 
basis of a diminished capacity [27]. However, in Feinberg, the requirement of the 
irresistible impulse demands that the agent act in an emotional delirium, according 
to the M’Naghten rule or the irresistible impulse test. Thus, the agent is only excused 
if he or she assumed that he or she was innocent or acted on the belief of being cov-
ered by a permissive rule. Hence, if a man conjectures, in attention to an emotional 
delirium, that he is the victim of a deadly attack and kills—in the assumption of a 
legitimate self-defense—he is excused [30]. Nevertheless, opposition is observed 
in the Chilean doctrine to the M’Naghten rule or the irresistible impulse test, in the 
line of argument of Michael S. Moore [31].
From what has been said, the insurmountable fear cannot be a simple represen-
tation of the principle of unenforceability. It is about determining if, through insur-
mountable fear, it is lawful to deduce the exclusion of criminal liability, although the 
legislator does not contemplate such a constellation in art. 10, No. 11. According to a 
teleological criterion, it is not possible to rule out such a possibility. As is known, the 
“leading case” is the case of Karina Sepúlveda. However, imagine that Karina had 
suffered a disorder of learned helplessness and had a support network. According to 
the traditional criterion, this should respond criminally, because learned helpless-
ness is a non-subsumable posttraumatic stress disorder in art. 10, No. 1. An example 
of this reasoning can be seen in the Supreme Court ruling, in Case No. 2809-2004, 
of August 18, 2004. In this judgment, the court granted a defendant the attenua-
tion of diminished imputability because, at the time of committing the crime, he 
presented “a chronic post-traumatic stress disorder [plus] a major depression with 
some psychotic symptoms, triggered by the death of his brother, the economic 
situation, the marriage separation, and the serious illness of his father at risk. 
Depression that would be the factor that prevented an adequate judgment of reality 
at the time of committing the crime.” The court, before such disorder, established 
that the agent “was not completely deprived of reason, but [this] is constituent of 
the attenuating circumstance [of] article 11, N° 1, in relation to article 10, N° 1.”
We believe that the correct thing is to affirm that, although the wrongfulness of 
the act remains in such a case, because the legal system should abide by the meta-
rule that nothing can justify the murder of an innocent, nobody can know with 
certainty if the killing action of the abuser had been prevented with the complaint 
of the facts to the authority. If this premise is accepted, from a doctrinal point of 
view, it would be necessary to maintain that there is room for fear in these types of 
situations of necessity. The determining factor here, as in the other cases of insur-
mountable fear, is not the moral judgment of the agent; for insurmountable fear, 
it seems sufficient that the author, objectively in a position to engage in other, less 
harmful conduct, strays from the requirements of the state of necessity because of 
the emotional disturbance he or she suffers.
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4. Findings of this project
Fear has a subjective basis related to emotional disturbances that cannot be 
redirected to the state of necessity. The state of necessity implies a deliberate 
decision that, in a situation of danger, meets the subsidiarity requirement. The 
last requirement that is foreign to insurmountable fear. For this reason, (a) insur-
mountable fear is an autonomous figure of the state of necessity; (b) insurmount-
able fear only includes real evils; and (c) insurmountable fear only demands 
the requirement of a situation of current or imminent danger in situations of 
necessity.
The following decision tree provides a consistent basis for criminal lawyers 
to define, examine, and identify the alternatives to necessity defense and the 
 unbeatable fear.
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5. Appendices and nomenclature
Learned helplessness is a conduct displayed by an animal or person following 
frequent adverse stimulations that are away from their control. Over the last years, 
neuroscience has presented an understanding of learned helplessness. In this 
context, the subject’s brain presumes that control is not present, and the existence 
of helpfulness is what is learned. Seligman’s learned helplessness theory helped in 
the development of the battered woman syndrome. Battered woman syndrome was 
discovered by Leonor Walker.
Dogmatics is a system of principles and rules developed by a group of criminal 
lawyers or criminal philosophers, such as Michael S. Moore, John Feinberg, Claus 
Roxin, Günther Jakobs, Urs Kindhäuser, Joachim Hruschka, Jan C. Joerden, and 
Michael Pawlik.
State of necessity or necessity defense is a criminal term used to describe why 
some extraordinary actions must be justified under the criminal law or exculpated 
in contravention of the law. Criminal defendants rely on this legal argument to 
argue that they should not be responsible for their actions because their conduct 
was the only way to prevent a greater harm when that conduct is not justified under 
self-defense.
M’Naghten rule is a test use to establish an excuse of insanity. M’Naghten rule 
must be demonstrated on a criminal trial at the time of the committing of the 
crime. The party accused must prove that he was under a defect of reason due to a 
disease of the mind. In this sense, it must be demonstrated that the party accused 
did not know what he was doing.
Phenomenology is a logical comprehension around the structures of con-
sciousness and the objects that are perceived through it. Phenomenology can be 
distinguished from the Cartesian system of analysis. Husserl’s conception is initially 
involved with this philosophical perspective and subsequently with psychology.
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